Our paper, "Resource Sharing in Energy Communities: A Cooperative Game Approach," has been accepted at IEEE PES General Meeting 2024 in Seattle, WA.
arXiv link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.18792
The paper focuses on showing the advantages of ex-ante resource allocation mechanisms over well-established ex-post mechanisms such as the Shapley value and the proportional rule. Two community DER scheduling algorithms are examined. The first is a community with centrally controlled DER, whereas the second is decentralized letting its members schedule their own DER locally. For both communities, we prove that the cooperative game's value function is superadditive, hence the grand coalition achieves the highest welfare. We also prove the balancedness of the cooperative game under the two DER scheduling algorithms, which means that there is a welfare re-distribution scheme that de-incentivizes players from leaving the grand coalition to form smaller ones.
